GDPR security and confidentiality compliance in LMS' a problem analysis and engineering proposal by Amo Filvá, Daniel et al.
GDPR Security and Confidentiality compliance in LMS’ a 
problem analysis and engineering solution proposal. 
Dani Amo Filvà† 
 Department Name 
 Institution/University Name 
 City State Country 
 email@email.com 
Marc Alier, Maria Jose Casañ 
 ESSI 
 UPC 
 Barcelona 
 marc.alier@upc.edu , 
mjcasany@essi.upc.edu 
Fonsi, Fran 
 Department Name 
 Institution/University Name 
 City State Country 
 email@email.com 
ABSTRACT 
The authors have studied the main Learning Management 
Systems (LMS) and found that all the personal information and 
activity and logs are stored unencrypted on the server filesystem 
and databases. This means that a user with access to such 
resources may have full access to all the personal information 
and meta information. Making the LMS installation very difficult 
to comply with the GDPR and very vulnerable to information 
leaks due to targeted hacker attacks.  
In this paper, we analyze this problem from a technical and 
operational perspective for the open-source market leader LMS: 
Moodle, and we propose a solution and a prototype of 
implementation. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years some organizations that provide services in 
the education sector, have been caught red-handed using 
personal information of students and metadata for unjustified 
commercial purpose. This has contributed to raising concerns 
about the management of personal information and the data 
generated while using online educational apps, such as a 
Learning Management System (LMS).  This is especially relevant 
in the case of Learning Analytics (LA) since it involves 
collecting, storing and analyzing student personal data, metadata 
of their behavior [3]. The participation of multiple actors leads to 
a situation where different entities can be using sensible 
information and their analysis for their own benefit. 
We can find plenty of examples: Williamson points out in the 
use of apps such as ClassDojo to change social and emotional 
behavior in minors [14]. There are cases of unethical practices 
like inBloom Schools or AltSchool [1], in which students were 
treated like guinea pigs and raw material for the improvement of 
the software. And of course, China is using all kind of 
surveillance technologies on their schools [4–6] in practices that 
for western values would be unethical.  
All these situations show that both the research and the 
applications of Learning Analytics need to improve in their 
consideration of ethics, confidentiality, and security. A recent 
study conducted by the authors detected that privacy, security, 
and confidentiality information were like the elephant in the 
room in the studies presented at the LAK conference in recent 
years. 
The Learning Management System is the system that stores 
and manages most of the sensitive personal data and metadata. 
And a quick analysis of these systems reveals that the student's 
digital identity and personal data are also unprotected:  Data is 
stored unencrypted in the database or the filesystem. Every user 
that has access to the server has full access to all information. If 
the system is hacked the bad guys hit the jackpot and can steal 
all data from students.   According to The K-12 Cybersecurity 
Resource Center [10] one attack is successfully executed every 3 
days since 2016. So, this is not a small matter.  
Interoperability between platforms is a cause of breaking the 
chain of custody of information and a potential source of data 
leaks when using third-party untrusted or untrustworthy add-
ons. 
In addition, the transfer of data between countries converts 
the situation into one of more complex and political nuance. The 
GDPR [12] imposes legal regulations on data transfer processes 
outside the EU (GDPR, recital 101), but it is the recipient 
governments that end up having the management and control of 
access. 
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This complex situation of distrust in the use of personal data 
is approachable from two directions: a) the implementation of 
the legal regulations and ethical codes into the business 
processes. b) a sound technological implementation to support it. 
We propose a combined action so that the technological 
approach automates the business rules that ensure compliance 
with legality, agreements with users and the ethical code [2]. It is 
necessary a technological alignment with the current legislation, 
the confidentiality policies of the entities, the exercise of the 
rights of the users and the current LMS. 
Automating the GDPR in the LMS could help solve the state 
of distrust if is communicated effectively. It implies solving a 
technological challenge: validating the user authorization in all 
data access transactions. Hence, we need guarantee the user has 
the proper authorizations every when the running code accesses 
data on its behalf. We consider it a double problem since it must 
be confirmed that the identity of the user is the same both in the 
execution of the LMS code and in the access to the stored data. 
We call the problem of "double authorization". 
Therefore, we are faced with a technical problem with a 
complex solution that encompasses different levels of 
abstraction, starting by getting a clear understanding of the legal 
regulations and its implications down to the realm of software 
engineering and systems operations. 
In this paper, we analyze the problem of double authorization 
in LMS. First, we introduce the problem. Then we continue with 
the legal approaches and continue with the technological ones, 
both in relation to the problem. Finally, we propose a neutral 
technological solution that could be potentially implemented in 
most LMS with a reference implementation prototype for 
Moodle. 
2 Privacy and Confidentiality: the context 
marks its use 
The concepts of privacy and confidentiality have often been 
confused and used incorrectly. We consider appropriate a 
clarification in the concepts of privacy and confidentiality: 
The word "privacy" refers to protecting physical and intimate 
issues of a person, such as protecting her from physical contact. 
The word "confidentiality" refers to safeguarding the 
transmission of information, such as sharing academic data or 
health records. Privacy is invaded and confidentiality is breached 
[7, 11]. 
The word "privacy" comes from the Anglo-Saxon privacy and 
its translation into different languages of the European Union 
like "privacidad" in Spaniard refers to intimacy. However, data 
protection laws refer to the safeguarding of personal information 
collected. Therefore, in the GDPR "confidentiality" is used in the 
exercise of data protection instead of "privacy". However, in 
other legal contexts such as in the USA, the word "privacy" is 
closely linked to the protection of medical records and, therefore, 
to intimate matters. It is thus attributed to a meaning of 
protection of personal information, which is why its use is 
extended in contexts in which reference is made to data 
protection. 
Therefore, when dealing with intimacy protection we can 
establish an order of importance where "privacy" is placed above 
"confidentiality" because it implies a superset of restrictions. 
However, in data protection laws the right word used is 
"confidentiality" since the legal context refers to the 
management of information of a person's data. 
In the present work, we use confidentiality instead of privacy 
due to the context of information processing (personal data) in 
Learning Analytics processes. In the first place, because 
researchers are part of a country in the European territory where 
privacy refers to physical intimacy. Secondly, because the word 
confidentiality defines an adequate treatment of a person's 
information. And thirdly because only confidentiality appears in 
the legal texts of the GDPR, including in the English texts. 
3 The double-authorization problem in the 
LMS 
The interactions a student has online (access to resources and 
learning activities) create and manages a lot of personal data that 
LMS stores on the database and filesystem. The right to access 
and modify this information has very sensitive implications in 
terms of confidentiality and security. 
The following questions need to be considered in terms of 
access rights: 
• Who can access a particular set of information?
• Who can use it and why?
• Given a user and its role in the platform: which sets
information can access and with what kind of access rights 
(read, write, read/write)? 
And more questions arise related to security: 
• Where is the information stored?
• How is the information stored? Is it encrypted? How safe is
this encryption?  Who has the keys?  
The legal experts we have consulted pointed to us that a 
careful interpretation of GDPR requires that the identity of the 
user and the associated permissions be validated every time that 
confidential data is accessed: the user’s authorization status 
needs to be checked.   
But in the LMS confidential data is accessed from the source 
code of the LMS all the time. Actions like reading a class forum 
where we can see the classmate’s names and pictures and links 
to their profile pages and accessing the list of course participants 
or the history tab on a wiki page, all require accessing 
confidential information about peer students. Obviously, a user 
with the role of teacher or instructor will be constantly 
accessing, modifying and adding confidential information like 
grades. In all these instances a proper use and access to 
confidential information are only guaranteed by the LMS source 
code. This means tens of thousands of lines of source code.  
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Can we guarantee that the code of your LMS of choice checks 
and respects carefully the permissions of every user and role 
before accessing confidential information? Off course not.   
Can we guarantee that the code is bug-free? Neither.  And 
even if we could do it at a level of the software vendor or open-
source project, we still have to cope with all the custom code 
that most of the institutions run on their installations for 
purposes of integration with the .   
To make matters worse modifying the code of an LMS is 
relatively easy because most of the programming languages for 
web development are interpreted, so they are visible and editable 
from a simple text editor. The source code can be modified by an 
employee or a hacker attack, especially in those LMS that run on 
interpreted languages like PHP or Python. Any modification at 
the code level can open yet another breach in the confidentiality 
or security of personal data and break with the legal 
requirements.  
Therefore, we are looking for a solution that can withstand 
bugs in the code and malicious code modifications. 
4 Legal approach 
The GDPR exposes that "rapid technological developments 
and globalisation have brought new challenges for the protection 
of personal data. The scale of the collection and sharing of 
personal data has increased significantly. Technology allows 
both private companies and public authorities to make use of 
personal data on an unprecedented scale in order to pursue their 
activities. Natural persons increasingly make personal 
information available publicly and globally." (GDPR, recital 6). 
Therefore, the European Union promulgates a new legal 
framework (GDPR) to reduce legal uncertainty and generate 
confidence in the treatment of personal data of its citizens. 
4.1  Granularity in the GDPR 
In point 2 of Article 4 of the RGPD, treatment is defined as 
“any operation or set of operations which is performed on 
personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by 
automated means, such as collection, recording, organization, 
structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction;”. Therefore, we consider that 
the right to object is critical in the resolution of the problem, as 
well as its contextualized application. In an LMS context, we 
consider that the LMS itself, describes the global one and the 
courses describe its subcontexts.  
Each user of the LMS has the right to have guaranteed 
confidentiality and security of their personal data in a way that: 
1. Can object to the processing of personal data by exercising 
the right to object. The right to object focuses on past, 
present and future data. 
2. Can indicate when to eliminate the personal data by 
exercising the right to be forgotten. The right to be 
forgotten (deletion) focuses on past data. 
The figure of the Data Provider Officer allows the resolving of 
requests regarding the erasure of personal data collected. 
Technically this is already possible. However, the LMS is not 
ready to resolve the requests regarding the right to object at a 
given time, and in a specific course. 
4.2 Legal agreements and conditions 
With the legal agreements, the institutions regulate the uses 
of the services provided to the students, such as the LMS. The 
relationship between the educational entity and the student is 
contractual. Students pay to obtain a service. This implies that: 
1. The students of an LMS must accept the conditions 
expressed by the educational institution.  
2. The conditions must be informed and made available in 
legal agreements, privacy policies or terms of use. 
3. The students cannot discuss the clauses. 
4. The students can use the LMS once they have accepted the 
conditions. 
Moreover, the GDPR grant to students a series of rights that 
allow them to evade accepted agreements in exceptional 
situations. These rights are (GDPR, recital 156): to rectification, 
to erasure, to be forgotten, to restriction of processing, to data 
portability, and to object when processing personal data for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes. Hence, the educational 
institutions have the obligation to set use clauses that respect the 
students' rights. 
4.3 Right to object 
The student has the right to object to the processing of the 
personal data, once the student accepts the conditions. The 
GDPR expressly recognizes the right of the interested party to 
object at any time, for reasons related to their particular 
situation (recital 50 y article 21), that concerning personal data 
are subject to a treatment based on the provisions of the article 6 
of the chapter II “Principles”, point 1, letter e) or f) of the GDPR. 
The person in charge of data processing will have to prove that 
their interests prevail over those of the interested party [13]. 
Moreover, the right to object must be granular in legal 
agreements. 
The courses in an LMS, are usually legally covered by a 
unique legal agreement. However, due to personal causes, the 
students can exercise their right to object in all of the courses or 
in a specific course. Therefore, the LMS must technically 
consider this possibility, especially due to causes of gender 
violence or the preservation of identity for policies. 
In no case, the student will be able to set conditions in the 
treatment or in the use of her data. The student cannot choose to 
hide or show her profile picture to specific classmates. When a 
student accepts the conditions, she only has some rights to 
exercise, such as the right to object. However, the student can 
exercise her rights in a context or another, being these contexts 
the departments or courses of the LMS of the same educational 
institution. 
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5 Technological approach 
Since the introduction of GDPR, most LMS have been 
updated to facilitate the process of dissemination of terms of 
service and tracking the acceptance of terms of service by the 
users and blocking the access to the users who do not agree to 
terms. However, the granularity in the right of opposition is not 
supported in any of the LMS analyzed, including Moodle. The 
cases where a user could exercise her right to reject certain 
conditions when in theory it would not impede the access to the 
service are not supported. Is all or nothing.  
  This granular level of control, although considered an 
exception, must be available to avoid problems of social 
connotations. It is the case of gender violence victims or civil 
servants like police who need certain level of confidentiality. For 
example, a student could refuse to display her name to 
classmates or display an alias and fake picture. 
Some may say (and said on interviews the authors 
performed) that these cases constitute exceptions and the design 
of the system depend on them. But the authors consider that 
these exceptions should indeed be integrated into the very 
design of the system, like accessibility ramps into public 
buildings. 
In any case, a technological approach is required to deal with 
the exceptions derived from the application of the GPDR. 
The GDPR imposes a series of conditions on technological 
solutions to ensure adequate security and confidentiality of 
personal data. The GDPR provides that:  
1. Guaranteeing the security and confidentiality of personal 
data requires a neutral technological approach and should 
not depend on the techniques used (GDPR, recital 15). 
Defining a solution based on a particular technology breaks 
with the recitals and articles of the GDPR. However, a 
paradox occurs since any technical solution requires 
applying concrete and appropriate approach to the context. 
2. In order for the identity of the student to be preserved 
throughout the cycle of personal data processing, the 
technological solution must consider safeguarding 
processes for effective protection of data from the design 
and by default of the products and services [9]. 
To address the technological paradox and solve the problem 
from the design and by default, we propose a high-level solution 
and two actions. This double solution does not define the 
technology to be used, it helps to make the technology 
transparent to the user and guarantee the security and 
confidentiality of personal data: 
All LMS must generate a matrix of granular access to data 
(access matrix) with identities, contexts and access permissions 
according to the legal agreements and the opposition rights 
already exercised and in force. 
The storage system must double-check the identity by 
synchronizing with the LMS. 
5.1 Access matrix 
A student must accept the legal conditions of the LMS before 
using it. This process generates a record of those students who 
have accepted and those who are pending to accept. This register 
works as a granular data access matrix since it indicates in it 
which students the data can be seen and which ones are not yet. 
Therefore, this matrix is very important, since the LMS should 
use it to show or hide personal data of students. 
In addition, the student can exercise the right of opposition to 
the processing of personal data. It must be reflected in the data 
access matrix both those students who have accepted or not the 
legal conditions and those who have exercised the right to 
oppose the processing of data. 
By default, when a student accepts the conditions, the LMS 
allows their classmates to see certain personal data of theirs, 
such as name, surname or profile picture. The teacher always has 
access to your data, even if the student has exercised the right to 
object to the processing of personal data. In addition, the right of 
opposition must be granular per each course. Therefore, each 
casuistry must be distinguished for an LMS to apply the GDPR 
well: 
• Legal conditions: When a student accepts the legal 
conditions allows any student enrolled in the same subject 
to see their personal data. 
• Right of opposition to data processing: When a student 
exercises the right of opposition to the data processing in an 
LMS is indicating 
1. that no interaction is registered in the system  
2. that in those subjects in which this has been applied 
right students cannot see your data or know of its 
existence. While the student has accepted the 
conditions and is registered in a subject, the teachers of 
such subjects must be able to access their personal data 
and identify them for the proper functioning of the 
evaluation. 
A data access matrix must have the following internal 
structure: 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Data access matrix 
 Legal 
cond. 1 
Legal 
cond. 2 
Legal 
cond. 3 
Course 1 Course 2 
    Right to 
object  
Right to 
object 
Student 1 ü ü ü X X 
Student 2 ü ü ü X ü 
 
In the above data access matrix, we show “Student 1" who 
has accepted the legal conditions and has not exercised any 
opposition to data processing. On the other hand, "Student 2" has 
accepted the legal conditions, in "Course 1" it does not oppose 
the processing of data, but in "Course 2" it does oppose. The data 
access matrix must contemplate a higher granularity since the 
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law so indicates. For example, separating the right not to be seen 
by the students, but to store their interactions in their logs.  
6 Hands on enforcing confidentiality 
6.1 Add granularity and responsibility to the 
access matrix 
All LMS implements a form of access matrix to determine 
what authorization each user has.  
To ensure the level of confidentiality and security proposed 
by the GDPR, we must add complexity levels to the access 
matrix and add additional checks.  
The access matrix must consider that on the one hand (1) the 
user logged in has accepted the legal conditions (and 
responsibilities), and on the other hand (2) guarantees the 
possible rights to object exercised by their peers. Thus, we 
ensure that: 
• A user of an LMS can only see the data of other users 
according to the legal conditions accepted and their exercise 
of the right to object. 
• Allow the person in the organization that performs the 
functions of Data Privacy Officer (DPO) to manage who or 
what roles, which by hierarchy are above the students, can 
freely access their data, as is the case of the technical 
administrator.  
The condition (1) "the logged-in user has accepted the legal 
conditions (and responsibilities)" has been incorporated in the 
latest versions of systems such as Moodle, which manages this in 
its mid-2018 update to support the GDPR. 
6.2  Encrypt and add double authorization 
In most or all of the main LMS of the market, when a student 
accesses an LMS, he generally uses authentication based on the 
user name or email and password. At the time of authentication, 
a temporary session is created to validate any student action 
within the LMS. That is the standard authentication process, and 
it guarantees us (to some extent) that the user is who he is and 
therefore the LMS code can make use of his level of 
authorization when executing code in his session. For that, as we 
have seen in 6.1, the access matrix that the LMS implements 
internally is used for each context of the LMS (course, group, 
activity), user, and function used. 
Although we can expand the functionality of the access 
matrix to comply with what is explained in 6.2, we still have a 
significant problem: confidential data is not encrypted. With 
what confidential information can be leaked in cases like: 
 
• Errors in the source code. The majority of LMS in the 
market are projects with more than 10 years of life [8], 
backward compatibility problems of plugins and content, 
and presumably with thousands of lines of "croft" code that 
nobody dares to touch just in case. This makes it very 
difficult to ensure that (1) there are no bugs, (2) that the 
access matrix is strictly respected and (3) that the 
modifications in the suggested access matrix will not 
introduce more bugs.  
• Employees with the professional ethics of an expired 
peanuts snack pack who decide to sell confidential 
information to the highest bidder.  
• Hackers attacks. Once a hacker has access to the system, he 
has access to everything. There are no internal layers of 
security.  
 
Therefore, we propose that confidential data in tables and 
files (such as log files that feed LA systems) should be encrypted. 
Encrypting log files does not imply any technical problem since 
the system normally only writes to them, and only external 
learning analytics plugins or systems use them.  
Encryption of data in tables, such as the table containing the 
user data, is more complex because it is accessed from all parts of 
the system. In systems, with strict object-oriented programming 
and where we are sure that the programmers do not take 
"shortcuts", it could be done easily creating subclasses that will 
manage the access to encrypted information. Of these systems, 
we do not know the existence of any.  
The solution we propose is to create a database driver that 
encapsulates the real driver of the database used by the LMS. 
This driver, called AuthChecker (see Figure 1), analyzes the 
queries emitted by the LMS code. In the case of access requests 
to confidential data, the AuthChecker's mission is to consult the 
access matrix to verify that the user has authorization or not, 
before providing the decrypted data. 
 
 
Figure 1: The solution we propose, called AuthChecker. 
 
The AuthChecker should have two parts: one as a database 
driver compatible with the current system, which the LMS code 
can invoke transparently. And another part located in a safe 
place and only accessible to the DPO where the encryption and 
decryption of data are done. 
The AuthChecker should have two additional components: a 
monitoring one that reports the unauthorized attempts to detect 
hackers and anomalies, and a debugging one in case the wrong 
queries are caused by system bugs. 
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7 Moodle 
We have developed the solution to the problem of double 
authorization (see Figure 1). The development consisted in: 
• Update and create a set of tables to store and encrypt the 
access matrix. 
• Create an API to query the access matrix from the database, 
called “Matrix Access API”. 
• Create an API to log the unauthorized queries, called the 
“AuthChecker Monitoring API”. 
• Create a database driver (AuthChecker) to make requests to 
the Matrix Access API and enforce authorization to data 
queries. 
Figure 2 shows the organization of the different developed 
components and the execution flow that enable the solution in 
Moodle. 
 
Figure 2: Components and execution flow of the developed 
solution. 
This organization and operation ensure that the conditions 
defined in the access matrix are checked both in the Moodle code 
and at the query level of the database, thus checking who does it 
and if it has permission to access the information, or even if have 
the right to make the request. 
8 Conclusions 
In recent years some organizations that provide services in 
the education sector, have been caught red-handed using 
personal information of students and metadata for unjustified 
commercial purpose. This has contributed to raising concerns 
and distrust about the management of personal information in 
the Learning Management System (LMS).  This is especially 
relevant in the case of Learning Analytics (LA) since it involves 
collecting, storing and analyzing student personal data, metadata 
of their behavior. 
This complex situation of distrust in the use of personal data 
can be addressed by a) implementing legal regulations, such as 
GDPR, and ethical codes into the business processes b) and a 
sound technological implementation to support it. We propose a 
combined action so that the technological approach automates 
the business rules that ensure compliance with legality, 
agreements with users and the ethical code. 
In most or all of the main LMS of the market, when a student 
accesses an LMS, he generally uses authentication based on the 
user name or email and password. At the time of authentication, 
a temporary session is created to validate any student action 
within the LMS. That is the standard authentication process, and 
it guarantees us that the user is who he is and therefore the LMS 
code can make use of his level of authorization when executing 
code in his session. All LMS implements a form of access matrix 
to determine what authorization each user has. However, this is 
not enough to ensure the levels of confidentiality and security 
established by the GDPR in regard to personal data. Therefore, 
we must add complexity levels to the access matrix and add 
additional checks. 
We analyze this problem from a technical and operational 
perspective for the open-source market leader LMS: Moodle, and 
we propose a solution and a prototype of implementation. 
The solution we propose is to create a database driver to 
enforce a second authorization check. The driver, called 
AuthChecker, ensures that the conditions defined in the access 
matrix are checked both in the LMS code and at the query level 
of the database. 
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